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Abstract
This paper quantiﬁes the eﬀects of the Swedish green car rebate (GCR), a program to
reduce oil dependence and greenhouse gas emissions in the automobile industry. We estimate
the demand for automobiles in the Swedish market and simulate counterfactual policies to
assess diﬀerent program dimensions. Our most conservative estimates ﬁnd the GCR to have
increased the market shares of green cars by 5.5 percentage points and its cost to be about
$109/tonCO2 saved, thus 5 times the price of an emission permit. Since the main green
cars in Sweden are FFVs (ﬂexible-fuel vehicles), which can seamlessly switch between (high-
CO2 emissions) gasoline and (low-CO2 emissions) ethanol, fuel choice is another dimension
policymakers need to consider  once fuel arbitrage is accounted for, the cost of CO2 savings
increases by over 16 percent if 50 percent of FFV owners drive on gasoline instead of ethanol.
Moreover, the GCR design was detrimental to Swedish carmakers, which lost substantial
market share due to the policy. As the GCR gives vehicles able to operate on alternative
(renewable) fuels a favorable treatment as compared to those operating only on regular (fossil)
ones, we also consider a counterfactual in which they are treated equally. Our ﬁndings suggest
that consumers would have switched to the FFV technology even without the rebate.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H23, H25, L11, L62, L71, L98, Q42, Q48.
Keywords: CO2 emissions; Ethanol; Environmental policy; Flexible-fuel vehicles; Fuel econ-
omy; Green Car; Governmental policy; Greenhouse gases; Renewable fuels.
∗We thank Tobias Olsson for making data available, Alexandra Lindfors and Martin Roxland for research assis-
tance, and participants at the SBE Meeting, the SSE Empirical Micro and REAP-MOITA workshops for feedback.
We are also indebted to Nikita Koptyug, Henrique Pacini and Heleno Pioner (REAP-MOITA discussant) for com-
ments. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Stockholm School of Economics. Email address: cristian.huse@sse.edu. Web: http://cristianhuse.webs.com.
Correspondence address: Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Phone: + 46 8736
9167.
‡University of São Paulo (FEA-RP). Email address: claudiolucinda@fearp.usp.br. Correspondence address: Av.
Bandeirantes, 3900, Monte Alegre, 14040-900, Ribeirão Preto-SP, Brazil. Phone: + 55 16 3602 4971.
1
1 Introduction
Road transportation is responsible for 20 percent of the CO2 emissions generated by fuel
consumption worldwide. With the growth of emerging economies, fuel demand for transportation
needs is set to grow by 40 percent and the number of passenger cars worldwide is set to double to
almost 1.7 billion by 2035 (IEA 2011a, 2011b). Within the European Union, passenger cars are
responsible for about 12 percent of the overall emissions. This share is a much higher 19 percent in
Sweden, and close to the 20 percent estimated to hold for the US market, as the country has one
of the most fuel-devouring car ﬂeets on the continent (Commission of the European Communities
2007). Reducing emissions from passenger cars is thus essential for Sweden to meet EU-wide
environmental goals.1 In practice  especially when gasoline taxes are diﬃcult to sustain on
political grounds  this essentially involves increasing fuel economy standards of the means of
transport and/or investing in alternative fuels and transportation technologies (Parry, Walls and
Harrington 2007).
This paper examines the eﬀect of regulation on the Swedish new passenger car market. Specif-
ically, it evaluates the eﬀect of the Swedish Green Car Rebate (GCR) on CO2 emissions savings,
their costs (both total costs and cost per ton of saved CO2) as well as the market shares of the
diﬀerent brands operating in this market. The Swedish automobile industry is responsible for
substantial amounts of employment, investment, exports and R&D in the country. 2 As a result,
one may argue that on top of environmental concerns a policy such as the GCR could have been
tailored to beneﬁt domestic producers, either because of the economic importance of the industry
or due to the fact that regulators are likely to be captured by businesses during regulatory design
(Laﬀont and Tirole 1991, Boyer and Laﬀont 1999). Thus, this paper also examines to which extent
domestic carmakers beneﬁted from its design, if at all.
The Swedish Green Car Rebate The Swedish Green Car Rebate (GCR) is one among a
number of policies designed to incentivize the purchase of fuel-eﬃcient vehicles worldwide amid
the ever growing concern with GHG and the quest for oil independence. 3 The GCR, which consisted
of a 10,000 SEK rebate paid to private individuals purchasing new environmentally friendly  or
green  cars.4 Two features distinguish the GCR from similar policies elsewhere. First, in contrast
with related policies elsewhere which have typically not been applied widely enough to aﬀect a
large fraction of the new vehicle market (Sallee 2011a), the GCR was broad in that green cars
commanded a 25 percent market share among newly-registered cars already in 2008, as compared
to the 2.15 percent commanded by HEVs in the US after a similar policy (Beresteanu and Li 2011).
1The 1994 EEA Treaty originally set a target of 120 gCO2/km by 2005 (later relaxed to 130 gCO2/km by 2012)
and aimed at cutting carbon emissions by 20 percent by 2020 compared to the levels of 1990. For perspective,
Sweden's ﬂeet does lag behind most EU 25 countries when it comes to average CO2 emissions; these are lower only
than those of Estonia and Latvia (EFTE 2009).
2Having originated in Sweden, Volvo and Saab were taken over by US carmakers, thus becoming brands within
conglomerates Ford and GM, respectively. The change in corporate control did not change the fact that the bulk of
activities such as design, engineering and manufacturing was still performed in Sweden, so much so that both are
still considered local brands by Swedish consumers. Out of a population of 9 million, some 120,000 are employed
by the automobile industry, which is responsible for over 10 percent of Swedish exports (BIL Sweden 2010).
3Subsidies were awarded to hybrid and electric vehicles in the US and Canada; China and Brazil reduced sales
tax; scrappage programs were launched in the US and a number of European countries in 2008 and 2009. Given its
design, the policy we study is closer in spirit to the US hybrid subsidy.
4The rebate amounts to 6 percent oﬀ of the price of a new VW Golf 1.6, being in the range $1,300-1,500. In
what follows we use a SEK/$ exchange rate of 7 unless mentioned otherwise.
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On the supply side, the number of green car models available on the Swedish market increased
from 73 to 120 already in 2008  for perspective, Beresteanu and Li (2011) document 15 hybrid
models available on the US market in 2007.5
Second, the GCR relies on alternative (renewable) fuels to achieve its aims. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the skew towards renewables was inspired by Brazil, whose CO2 emissions per unit
of fuel consumption in road traﬃc are 20 percent below the world average due to the use of ethanol
(IEA 2011a), although getting the support of the Swedish Green Party is sometimes also mentioned
as an explanation for this policy feature.6 The GCR deﬁned a green car according to which fuels it
is able to operate on and on how much CO2 it emits: while cars able to run only on regular (fossil)
fuels (such as gasoline and diesel) were considered green cars provided they emitted no more than
120 gCO2/km, those able to run on alternative fuels (ethanol, electricity, and gas  which we call
CNG hereafter) were given a more lenient treatment roughly equivalent to 220 gCO2/km. As a
result, 54 among the 120 green cars marketed in 2008 were alternative ones and two-thirds of the
new green cars registered in 2008 were able to operate using renewable fuels. Among these, the
dominant ones are FFVs (ﬂexible fuel vehicles), which seamlessly operate using any combination
of ethanol and gasoline. While the ﬁrst FFV dates back to the early 1900s  the Ford Model T
was able to operate on gasoline, kerosene and ethanol it was only in the 1980s that vehicles able
to operate using renewable fuels took center stage, in the Brazilian market. However, since the
technology was based on captive ethanol vehicles, consumers were eﬀectively locked-in and suﬀered
due to fuel shortages, which eventually resulted in the demise of the captive ethanol technology in
the country.7 The FFV technology currently in operation was introduced some 15 years ago and
is available mostly in Brazil, the US and Sweden.
Empirical Strategy We quantify the impacts of the Swedish GCR by estimating a structural
model for the Swedish car market and examining a number of counterfactuals to the actual policy.
To do so we use a unique registration-based data set for the Swedish car market with car models
disaggregated at the fuel segment level which we combine with product characteristics, fuel and
mileage data.
In our analysis, we focus on both environmental and market eﬀects of alternative policies. On
the environmental side we quantify CO2 emission savings as well as their cost. On the market
side, we focus on market shares of diﬀerent fuel segments and brand market shares. This allows
to evaluate the role of the skew towards renewables and how the program aﬀected diﬀerent car
manufacturers.
We consider three counterfactuals. First, we assess the overall impact of the GCR by considering
a scenario with no environmental policy. Next, we address a key feature of the GCR, namely the
asymmetric treatment of vehicles running on regular as compared to those running on alternative
fuels. That is, we assess what would have happened had one treated regular and alternative fuels
in a similar way by letting only vehicles emitting no more than 120 gCO2/km be classiﬁed as
5In the Swedish market, product introduction in the FFV and low-emission segments typically occurs via the
introduction of new variants (versions) of existing models.
6While countries such as France and Germany established an emission ceiling in their programs, the US has
put forth a scrappage scheme; Sweden combined an emission threshold with renewable fuel requirements. See
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/road.htm for an overview of the European framework. Note also
that in the US the emission requirement is replaced with a (roughly equivalent) fuel economy one.
7The New York Times (1989) reports in late 1989 how "taxi ﬂeets have started to glide to a halt, as many as
two-thirds of Rio's service stations have closed their alcohol [ethanol] pumps, (...) a 400-car alcohol line blocked
traﬃc on the Rio-Sao Paulo highway" and mentions a 40 percent shortfall in ethanol supplies expected for early
1990.
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green cars and thus qualify for the rebate. Finally, we examine what would have happened had all
carmakers decided to turn their captive gasoline cars into FFVs to beneﬁt from the program. This
is a scenario consistent with what has happened in the mid-2000s in the Brazilian market, where
all major carmakers producing in the country decided to phase out captive gasoline vehicles in
favor of FFVs. Since the FFV technology piggybacks on the gasoline one, and the estimated cost
to turn a captive gasoline car into a FFV is $100-200 (and decreasing, thanks to the downward
trend in the prices of electronics, see Anderson and Sallee 2011), this scenario is arguably less
extreme than it looks at ﬁrst glance.
Main Findings On the environmental front, the results indicate that the GCR resulted in a
decrease in lifetime CO2 emissions of about 493.2 thousand tonCO2 for the vehicles sold during
the period in which the policy was in place. This implies a cost of 760 SEK/tonCO2 (or $109),
thus lower than the $177 obtained by Beresteanu and Li (2011) and at the lower end of results in
the range $91-288 obtained by Li, Linn and Spiller (2011) for the US market. 8
Accounting for the fact that a substantial share of FFV owners switches to the cheapest between
gasoline and ethanol results in non-trivial cost increases. For instance, if gasoline usage among
FFV owners is 50 percent, CO2 savings decrease by 14 percent and their costs by 16 percent as
compared to the benchmark, reaching 883 SEK or $126. That is, the FFV technology makes fuel
choice an additional dimension regulators have to take into account when designing policy.
Removing the asymmetry of the GCR would result in lower CO2 savings but also a lower cost,
in both absolute and relative terms. Importantly, since such a policy would not contemplate FFVs,
fuel arbitrage does not aﬀect the cost of the policy.
Finally, in a scenario where carmakers were to fully replace their captive gasoline models
with FFVs, CO2 savings would increase substantially, but at a high total cost for the taxpayer:
this alternative policy would result in a roughly ﬁvefold cost increase as compared to the GCR.
However, the high share of FFVs compounded with fuel switching would easily make the program
very expensive also in relative terms, e.g. if 50 percent of FFV owners arbitrage across fuels, the
cost of the program would be 36 percent above those of the actual GCR.
On the market front, the ﬁrst counterfactual highlights that high-emission vehicles, especially
those running on gasoline, suﬀered an ever increasing competition from fuel segments beneﬁting
from the GCR; these include low-emission regular vehicles and (high-emission) FFVs, all of which
were eligible for the rebate and jointly experienced a 5.5 percentage point increase in market shares
due to the policy. As a result, the main brands losing out from the policy were Swedish carmakers
Volvo and Saab as well as (high-end) German carmakers Audi, BMW and Mercedes, all with a
strong presence in the high emission gasoline segment.9
A symmetric version of the GCR would make Saab and high-end German brands better oﬀ
as compared to the actual policy. The reason why Volvo would be at the losing end under such
8These ﬁgures can be compared to the cost of similar programs in the US, to the price of European emission
permits and to the social cost of carbon (SCC). Emission rights were illiquid instruments during the period the
GCR was in place. Spot prices were in the range 118-142 SEK/tonCO2 at the end of each quarter in 2009 at the
then prevailing exchange rates. The SCC is estimated to be EUR 15 (150 SEK) per tonCO2 (Aldy, Krupnick,
Newell, Parry and Pizer 2010). In Sweden, policymakers distinguish between traded and non-traded goods; thus,
they price CO2 emissions from fuel at 1060 SEK/tonCO2, see Mandell (2011) for a discussion. We thank Jan-Eric
Nilsson for bringing up this point.
9In Sweden, Huse and Koptyug (2012) document that the 2007-2008 market shares of Volvo and Saab decreased
from 17.42 to 12.44 percent and from 4.11 to 3.74 percent, respectively, despite the GCR. Since the GCR is not
statistically signiﬁcant at explaining total sales in the Swedish market (see the Appendix for details), this suggests
that both carmakers did lose ground in the Swedish market during the period.
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counterfactual is its focus on the high emission fuel segments, but such losses would be mild,
amounting to less than half a percentage point. Importantly, the market share of FFVs would
decrease by less than 0.4 percentage point (from 14.1 to 13.7 percent) as compared to the GCR,
which suggests that consumers would have purchased FFVs regardless of the policy.
Finally, full conversion to the FFV technology would result in higher market shares for Swedish
and high-end German brands as compared to the actual GCR, at least partially restoring market
shares lost under the GCR. This ﬁnding once again shows how the FFV segment carved market
share at the expense of high-emission gasoline vehicles.
Contribution and Related Literature We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the
impact of policies targeted at the transportation sector, notably the automobile market, to promote
the adoption of fuel-eﬃcient technologies. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to structurally
investigate a green car policy with a broad impact on the automobile market and skewed towards
renewables. The use of a structural model allows to assess diﬀerent aspects of the policy by
performing counterfactuals.
The papers most closely related to ours are Chandra, Gulati and Kandlikar (2010) and Beresteanu
and Li (2011), which look at policies designed to promote the adoption of hybrid electric vehicles
(HEVs) in Canada and the US, respectively, both of which are close in spirit to the GCR. Typically,
the literature documents that although these programs tend to increase the market share of the
market segment they promote at the expense of other ones, their cost is substantial. 10 This ﬁnding
is likely to hold due to the fact that these programs typically target a small share of the market.
More generally, the paper relates to early work by Berry, Kortum and Pakes (1996) quantifying
the impact of policy and environmental changes on the US car market.
The paper also relates to the literature focusing on the cost of (environmental) regulation. For
instance, Gollop and Roberts (1983) estimate the economic costs of sulfur dioxide (SO2) regulation
in the US utility sector during the 1970s whereas Ryan (2011) estimates the cost of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments in the Portland cement industry.
The focus on alternative fuels connects the paper both to the literature studying the interaction
between fuel and car markets and to the one focusing on renewable fuels. In the case of the former,
the evidence is that consumer reactions are surprisingly slow (Borenstein 1993), a ﬁnding that can
be attributed to the fact that the dominant automobile engine is typically captive and/or there is
no fueling infrastructure available for alternative fuels. As opposed to what happens in markets
such as the US, Sweden has a well-developed network of fueling stations where ethanol is readily
available. Thus, the majority of FFV owners tends to react to fuel prices, eﬀectively arbitraging
across fuels (gasoline and ethanol) making fuel choice another dimension policymakers should take
into account when designing policies (Anderson 2012, Salvo and Huse 2013).
2 Institutional Background
Despite being smaller than markets such as the French and German, the Swedish car market is
comparable to larger European ones when looking at ownership on a per capita basis and ownership
per household, as reported in Table 1.11 At 9.5 years of age, the average Swedish car is however
older and its engine larger than its French or German counterparts. What is more, among the
10The most conservative estimate among the above papers, by Li et al (2011), is that the ton of CO2 saved cost
$91. At the other end of the spectrum, Metcalf (2008) estimates this cost to be $1700 for the US ethanol program.
11The numbers presented in Table 1 include all registered passenger cars, thus also including those owned by
businesses and government.
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EU 18 countries (the original EU 15 countries plus Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia) Sweden
consistently appeared at the bottom of the CO2 emissions ranking for years 2006-2008 (EFTE
2009). In what can be attributed to an early result of the GCR, the market share commanded by
cars able to run on renewable fuels as a fraction of the ﬂeet is the largest in Europe at almost 4
percent as of 2008 (ANFAC 2010).
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The Green Car Rebate The Swedish Green Car Rebate (GCR), which was passed in Parlia-
ment and announced to the public in March 2007 and eﬀectively starting in April 2007, consisted
of a 10,000 SEK (about $1500 using the average SEK/$ exchange rate during the period) transfer
to all private individuals purchasing a car classiﬁed as environmentally friendly, or green.
Carmakers were caught by surprise by the policy: product lines are typically launched once a
year and require carmakers to plan their overall strategy well in advance. In the Swedish market,
where this happens late in the fall, the product lines for model-year 2007 had been launched and
were already in the middle of their production cycle. As a result, carmakers were only able to
adjust their product lines to the rebate, i.e. re-engineer their vehicles, from model-year 2008.
To qualify as a green car and be eligible for the rebate, a car is to belong to the appropriate
environmental class and has to comply with certain emission criteria (SFS 2007). Cars are divided
into two categories: regular and alternative fueled cars. Cars running on fossil fuels (or regular
fuels) qualify as green cars if their CO2 emissions are no greater than 120 g/km. 1213 Cars able
to run on fuels other than gasoline and diesel (or alternative fuels) qualify as green cars if their
consumption is lower than the equivalent of 9.2 liters/100 km using gasoline or 9.7 m3/100 km
using gas (typically CNG, compressed natural gas); electric cars are considered green if their
consumption is no greater than 37 kWh/100 km. The diﬀerence in treatment dispensed to regular
and alternative fuels becomes evident if these ﬁgures are converted to emission levels: the threshold
for an alternative vehicle to be considered a green car is equivalent to about 220 gCO2/km running
on gasoline.14
The Swedish Passenger Car Market The overall number of brands and models on the
Swedish market increased during the sample period, especially following the inception of the GCR.
In particular, the changes in the number of low emission models (those emitting less than 120
gCO2/km) marketed were non-trivial, increasing from 46 in 2007 to 69 in 2008 and 89 in 2009, see
Table 2. These numbers suggest carmakers did react swiftly due, at least in part, to the GCR.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
12In contrast to the US market, emission thresholds in Sweden apply to individual cars rather than to a brand-
level sales-weighted average. At the equivalent of about 193 gCO2/mile, this emission threshold is already more
stringent than the 250 gCO2/mile CAFE standard to take eﬀect from 2016 in the US.
13Emissions of 120 gCO2/km correspond to fuel consumption of about 5 liters of gasoline or 4.5 liters of diesel
per 100 km (75.7 and 84.1 mpg, respectively). Diesel cars must also have particle emissions of less than 5 mg/km,
meaning that they need to have a particle ﬁlter.
14Although expressed in diﬀerent units (gCO2/km and l/100km) the CO2 emissions and fuel eﬃciency measures
are nearly equivalent; for vehicles marketed in Sweden, the correlation between CO2 emissions and mpg is -0.90,
and the threshold for alternative fuels is equivalent to about 220 gCO2/km (for perspective, the 2012 Porsche 911
Carrera emits 205 gCO2/km). See Anderson, Parry, Sallee and Fischer (2011) and Huse (2012) for details. In what
follows we use mostly units based on the metric system. That is, one kpl amounts to approximately 2.35 mpg since
1 mile equals 1.609 km and 1 gallon equals 3.78 liters; 9.2 liters/100km corresponds to 10.87 kpl or 25.54 mpg .
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The main alternative fuel in Sweden is ethanol (E85), a fuel available in over half of all fueling
stations in the country. It is a mixture of 85 percent ethanol and 15 percent gasoline in which
the gasoline works as a lubricant and helps start the engine. On the Swedish market, cars able
to operate on ethanol also do so on gasoline, thus being called FFVs (ﬂexible-fuel vehicles). The
price of an FFV is slightly higher than that of a comparable gasoline model, with second-hand
values being roughly equivalent. FFV engines essentially piggy-back on the standard (Otto cycle)
gasoline technology and oﬀer the possibility to seamlessly switch between gasoline and ethanol
may explain the swift adoption of FFVs.
Table 2 also reports that, starting from 2 models marketed in 2004 (two versions of the Ford
Focus), the number of FFV models increased to 18 in 2007, 44 in 2008 and 66 in 2009, typically
via the introduction of variants of existing models. The number of brands oﬀering FFVs also
increased substantially, from 1 in 2004 to 3 in 2007, 10 in 2008 and 12 in 2009. Interestingly, no
FFV emits less than 120 gCO2/km. The eﬀect of the GCR on the number of brands and models
oﬀering gas- and electric-based vehicles (which we refer to as gasoline/CNG and gasoline/electric
vehicles, respectively) was much less dramatic  in the case of the former, this can be explained
by the limited CNG retail network, concentrated in the southern part of the country, whereas in
the case of the latter, anecdotal evidence suggests that electric vehicles are considered poor value
for money by Swedish consumers.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
FFVs were the main gainers following the GCR reaching about 15 percent of registrations in
2008, while CNG and electric vehicles never commanded more than 1 percent of the market, see
Figure 1. The growth in the FFV share was, to a large extent, at the expense of high-emission
regular vehicles, which commanded a market share of 77.7 percent in 2008 down from a 94.7
percent in 2006. Although low-emission regular vehicles also gained market share, this was much
lower than the gain experienced by FFVs.
Purchasing a Car The registration of a vehicle with The Swedish Transport Agency (Trans-
portstyrelsen) must take place within ten working days of a change in vehicle ownership. Sweden
being a small market, car dealers keep a very low inventory level, so much so that typically one
has to order a car a few months in advance and make a deposit. This results in very few episodes
of sales or rebates from the part of carmakers and/or dealers. This evidence is reassuring in light
of the use of list prices when estimating demand.15
3 Data
We combine a number of data sets, from administrative-based registration data to car charac-
teristics, mileage and fuel data. (See the Appendix for details.)
Car Registrations Car registration data is from Vroom, a consulting ﬁrm. The data on pri-
vately owned vehicles (i.e., those eligible for the rebate) is recorded at the monthly frequency from
15List prices, sticker prices or MSRPs (manufacturer's suggested retail prices) are set by manufacturers and are
typically constant across geographic markets within a model-year. Given the diﬃculty in obtaining transaction
prices, MSRPs have commonly been used in the literature, e.g. Beresteanu and Li (2011) for a recent example.
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January 2004 to December 2009. An observation is a combination of month, brand, model and
fuel type.
Car Characteristics Product characteristics are obtained from the consumer guides Nybils-
guiden (New Car Guide) issued yearly by The Swedish Consumer Agency (Konsumentverket ). For
every car model available on the Swedish market the information includes characteristics such as
fuel type, engine power and size, number of cylinders, weight, fuel economy (city driving, highway
driving and mixed driving, with testing made under EU-determined driving cycle), CO2 emis-
sions (measured in gCO2/km under EU-determined driving conditions and mixed driving) and
list prices. We deﬂate the vehicle tax, car and fuel prices using the Consumer Price Index from
Statistics Sweden. For car prices and vehicle tax we use the yearly average with 2009 as the base
year and for fuel prices the monthly average with December 2009 as the base month.
Fuel Data We use market level data for fuels recorded at the monthly frequency at the national
level. Recommended retail fuel prices for gasoline, diesel and ethanol are obtained from the Swedish
Petroleum and Biofuels Institute (SPBI). These prices were deﬂated using the same CPI used for
car list prices.
Mileage Data We use administrative data from the Swedish Motor Vehicle Inspection Company
(Bilprövningen) on yearly average distances covered by Swedish passenger cars. For every year,
we observe average odometer readings for cars of 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10 years of age disaggregated by
brand, model, fuel type and body type.16
Combining Data sets One important issue arising when merging characteristics and registra-
tion data sets is that the former is observed at a more disaggregated level than the latter. Despite
being more aggregated than car characteristics, the level of aggregation in registrations is still
more reﬁned than standard market level data sets in that we observe sales for diﬀerent versions
at the fuel level. For each combination of year-brand-model-fuel we use characteristics from the
baseline version, i.e. the lowest priced model. Importantly, given the relatively small number of
green versions (typically one or two per model), aggregation issues for these models essentially
vanish.
4 Estimation
4.1 Demand
Model Speciﬁcation We estimate the demand for cars using discrete choice models for
market level data, following Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, BLP). The start-
ing point is a microeconomic model of rational behavior for individual consumers (or households)
which is then aggregated to generate market demands. Consumers buy at most one of the prod-
ucts available on the market and, if so, the one yielding the highest utility among the available
products. The econometrician does not observe individual choices, only market level data, i.e.
prices, quantities and a set of characteristics for each of the J products available on the market for
16That is, we do not observe micro level data on mileage. As a result, we are unable to estimate a joint model of
vehicle choice and utilization as in, e.g., Goldberg (1998).
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a number of periods (we suppress the index t below to avoid clutter). These inside products are
indexed by j = 1, ..., J , and the outside good, the option to buy a used car or to not buy a car at
all is represented by j = 0. Deﬁne the conditional indirect utility of individual i when consuming
product j as
uij =
K∑
k=1
xjkβ
∗
ik + ξj + εij, i = 1, ..., I; j = 1, ..., J
where xjk are observed product characteristics such as horsepower and engine size while ξj are
characteristics observed by the market participants but not the econometrician (such as quality,
style etc). We decompose the individual coeﬃcients as β∗ik = βk+σkvki, where βk is common across
individuals, vki is an individual-speciﬁc random determinant of the taste for characteristic k, which
we assume to be Normally distributed, (v1i, ..., vKi)
′ ∼ N (0,Σ), and σk measures the impact of
v on characteristic k. Finally, εij is an individual and option-speciﬁc idiosyncratic component of
preferences, assumed to be a mean zero Type I Extreme Value random variable independent of
both consumer attributes and product characteristics. Since consumers may decide not to buy
a new car, the speciﬁcation of the demand system is completed with an outside good yielding
conditional indirect utility ui0 = ξ0 + σ0vi + εi0, where εi0 is a mean zero individual market and
time speciﬁc idiosyncratic term and vi is an individual speciﬁc component reﬂecting heterogeneity
in tastes.
The above estimation strategy assumes away a number of important features in the car market.
First, given the coexistence of primary and secondary car markets (new and used cars), consumer
and ﬁrm expectations about car and fuel prices are important factors to be taken into account when
considering the car market  see Bento et al (2009) and Schiraldi (2011) for the joint modeling of
these markets. Cars are moreover durable products, so current ownership of a car is likely to aﬀect
the current demand for automobiles, see Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman
(2011) for ways of modeling intertemporal substitution. Our estimation approach, which is akin to
recent studies such as Klier and Linn (2010) and Beresteanu and Li (2011) thus clearly represents
a pragmatic modeling approximation to actual consumer choice behavior in the industry.
Identiﬁcation Besides the exogenous characteristics, we use the set of BST instruments, fol-
lowing Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997). That is, we use a set of polynomial basis func-
tions of exogenous variables within a market segment. BST instruments implicitly assume a form
of localized competition among products, and this seems consistent with anecdotal evidence for
the automobile industry, characterized by a number of market niches and highly diﬀerentiated
products.
Estimates We consider demand speciﬁcations with the following characteristics: engine power
(measured in horsepower, HP), engine size (measured in cubic centimeters, CC), fuel consumption
(liters/100km, under mixed driving), vehicle tax and price. We also include time (month), brand,
market segment, fuel segment (gasoline with emissions above and below 120 gCO2/km, diesel with
emissions above and below 120 gCO2/km, FFV, gasoline/electric and gasoline/CNG) ﬁxed-eﬀects
and interactions of fuel consumption and fuel segment ﬁxed-eﬀects.17 Consumer heterogeneity is
introduced onto price coeﬃcients via 500 antithetic pairs of random draws of the standard Normal
distribution. (The Appendix lists a number of alternative speciﬁcations also experimented with.)
17We have also experimented with product ﬁxed-eﬀects, with unsatisfactory results. This is likely to be due to
the use of a relatively short sample period, frequent name changes in products and moderate product entry and
exit.
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We report alternative demand estimates in Table 3. Speciﬁcation 1 (OLS) reports the esti-
mates obtained when price is assumed to be exogenous, i.e. it is a standard OLS logit regression
with market level data. Columns 2 and 3 report IV logit and RC logit estimates, respectively,
using the instruments suggested by BST (1997). More speciﬁcally, we take characteristics fuel
consumption and the ratio of engine power over weight and, for each market segment, we use
the sum of characteristics, the sum of the squared characteristics, and the cross product of these
characteristics across the other products produced by the same ﬁrm. The F-statistic of the ex-
cluded instruments of the ﬁrst-stage regression of price on the exogenous characteristics and the
instruments used is 31.48, thus suggesting that the instruments are not weak.
Speciﬁcation 1 features a negative and signiﬁcant price coeﬃcient of -0.0026 as well as a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for HP, suggesting that consumers value vehicles with powerful engines.
Road tax and fuel consumption coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant. That is, consumers seem
to shy away from high operating costs. Own-price elasticities are however typically less than one
in absolute value, which is inconsistent with the assumption of proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.
Accounting for price endogeneity as in Speciﬁcation 2 results in a steeper demand curve, in
that the estimated price coeﬃcient increases a ﬁvefold as compared to its OLS counterpart. An
immediate result from controlling for price endogeneity is the improved estimates of own-price
elasticities, the 10th and 90th percentiles are given by 4.2 and 1.4, respectively. HP, road tax
and fuel consumption load with the same signs as before, but the magnitude of HP increases by
a threefold. Finally, CC has a positive and signiﬁcant estimate, suggesting that consumers favor
engine size above and beyond HP.
Introducing consumer heterogeneity renders a price coeﬃcient βPrice of -0.0218, thus about eight
times the magnitude of its uninstrumented counterpart, and a statistically signiﬁcant random coef-
ﬁcient σPrice of 0.0060, see Speciﬁcation 3. More importantly, introducing consumer heterogeneity
substantially improves own-price elasticities, with the 10th and 90th percentiles given by 5.3 and
2.5, respectively. Such values imply markups in the range 19-40 percent and are in line with
standard estimates for European markets using market level data. For instance, Goldberg and
Verboven (2001) report elasticities in the range 3-6 in their Table 6.
The remaining estimates of Speciﬁcation 3 are broadly in line with economic theory and the
literature. That is, consumers value HP (engine power), engine size and a low road tax, but fuel
consumption ceases to be signiﬁcant once the random coeﬃcient is introduced. 18 The estimates
not reported in the interest of space exhibit largely intuitive patterns. For instance, the highest
brand ﬁxed-eﬀect is that of Mercedes Benz (3.3), followed by Volvo and Porsche (3.1), Saab (2.8)
and Audi (2.4), suggesting that consumers prefer Swedish and high-end German brands. French
brands Renault, Peugeot and Citroen have intermediate estimates whereas brands Daewoo, Dodge
and Rover have the lowest estimates. Moreover, in line with willingness-to-pay for vehicle size
found in previous studies, larger market segment are monotonically preferred to smaller ones.
18It is worth stressing that we use fuel in consumption (in liters/100km) as opposed to monetary measures, e.g.
miles per dollar as in BLP, obtained by combining fuel consumption (or fuel economy in mpg, say) with fuel prices.
Our choice stems from two factors. First, the lack of fuel price data for ethanol and CNG in the earlier part of the
sample. Second, due to the fact that, for FFV owners, this variable would depend on how they choose between
gasoline and ethanol, e.g. whether they arbitrage across fuels.
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4.2 Supply
We consider a standard diﬀerentiated product Bertrand-Nash pricing game on the supply side
of the market. There are J products (indexed by j = 1, ..., J) which are produced by F ﬁrms
(indexed by f = 1, ..., F ), each of which produces a subset of products =f ⊂ {1, ..., J}.19 Firm
f chooses the prices of its products to maximize its proﬁts according to the proﬁt maximization
problem
max
{pj |j∈=f}
∑
j∈=f
(pj − cj)Dj(p)
where cj is the marginal cost of product j, assumed constant. Provided equilibrium prices of
all products on the market are positive and all goods are sold in positive quantities (and so the
constraints for this program do not bind in equilibrium, as is typically assumed in the empirical
literature), the ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
Dk(p) +
∑
j∈=f
∂Dj(p)
∂pk
(pj − cj) = 0
Product ownership is represented by the ownership matrix which, to each product in the
market, assigns the ﬁrm producing it. Deﬁne the matrix ∆ of dimension J by J and typical
element
∆jk = 1{both j and k produced by the same ﬁrm, j, k = 1, ..., J}
where 1{.} is the indicator function. Using the ownership indicators, the ﬁrm's ﬁrst order condition
may be rewritten as:
Dk(p) +
J∑
j=1
∆jk
∂Dj(p)
∂pk
(pj − cj) = 0, k = 1, ..., J
The (implicit) solution to this set of equations, pNE = (pNE1 , ..., p
NE
J ), provides the prices
at which each ﬁrm is maximizing its proﬁts given the prices of others, and hence is the Nash
equilibrium price to the game. Notice that there is one of these ﬁrst-order conditions from ﬁrm
f 's objective function for every k ∈ =f . Thus, we obtain a total of J ﬁrst-order conditions, one for
each product. This set of ﬁrst order conditions is also re-solved in the various policy experiments,
discussed below. (See the Appendix for details.)
5 Policy Experiments
5.1 Overview
In what follows we consider three counterfactuals. Counterfactual I (No GCR) compares the
actual GCR and the counterfactual of no policy. This allows to quantify the overall eﬀects of the
19Although one could argue that the decision-makers are the conglomerates rather than the ﬁrms/brands, i.e., Ford
and GM instead of Volvo and Saab, anecdotal evidence for the Swedish market suggests that the local brands enjoyed
a substantial degree of independence, performing R&D and product design in Sweden. One event corroborating
this view is that since Saab and Volvo were not keen on launching FFVs in the late 1990s, the Swedish government
approached Ford with the guarantee to purchase a given number of FFVs per year if they were produced. This is
precisely how the FFV version of the Ford Focus was introduced in the Swedish market.
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program on both the environment and the market fronts.
Counterfactual II (Symmetric GCR) considers the eﬀects of a common threshold of 120
gCO2/km applied to regular and alternative fuels. One immediate eﬀect of such a symmetric
policy is that since no single FFV emits less than 120 gCO2/km (see Table 2), no FFV qualiﬁes
as a green car.20
Finally, Counterfactual III (Full Adoption of FFV Technology) assesses what would have
happened had all carmakers immediately decided to turn their captive gasoline cars into FFVs.
Although arguably extreme, this scenario is consistent with what has happened in the Brazilian
market in the mid-2000s, where all major carmakers decided to phase out gasoline vehicles in favor
of FFVs. That is, conditional on buying e.g. any Volkswagen car model produced in Brazil as
of 2006, a driver would acquire an FFV (Salvo and Huse 2011). In the US, carmakers have also
begun equipping models with ﬂexible fuel engines. With the ever decreasing price of electronics,
the cost of turning a captive gasoline car into a FFV is $100-200 (thus less signiﬁcant than those
in e.g. Berry, Kortum and Pakes 1996). This scenario thus stresses a potentially perverse eﬀect of
the program whereby too many FFVs would qualify for the rebate and increase the total cost of
the program, without necessarily using ethanol.21
We assess the above counterfactuals on both environmental and market aspects, namely (i)
CO2 emission savings and their associated costs (in SEK/tonCO2 saved); (ii) Market shares by
fuel segment; (iii) Brand market shares disaggregated up to fuel segment. Following the literature,
we allow carmakers to compete in prices à la Bertrand-Nash throughout the analysis. In doing
so we note that ours is essentially a short run analysis in that we do not account for endogenous
changes in product characteristics (see, e.g. Klier and Linn 2010, for a study in such direction).
To calculate CO2 emission savings, we combine mileage estimates and fuel economy data with
car sales in every scenario considered, with details presented in the Appendix. The resulting CO2
emissions are then divided by the total cost of the GCR to obtain the cost of CO2 savings.
While the baseline speciﬁcation in each experiment considers a situation in which FFV owners
do not drive using gasoline, we do also allow for the fact that FFVs enable their owners to arbitrage
across fuels. Since a non-negligible share of FFV owners in Sweden takes advantage of fuel arbitrage
and gasoline emits more CO2 than ethanol, fuel switching increases the cost of CO2 savings and
fuel choice is an additional margin policymakers have to take into account when considering the
design of policies.22 Thus, besides the baseline case (i.e., no gasoline usage by FFV owners) we
also report results for 25, 50 and 75 percent of gasoline usage to gauge the cost-eﬀectiveness of the
program.
20Although in this scenario one would expect carmakers to eventually bring to market a number of low-emission
FFV models, we follow the bulk of the literature since at least Pakes, Berry and Levinsohn (1993) and focus on
short-run eﬀects  a thorough long-run analysis would involve setting up a dynamic model of the industry and is
left for future research.
21In this scenario we assume away the existence of economies of scale in the adoption of FFVs in the Swedish
market. As illustrated in Table 1, the Swedish market is small when compared to other European ones. For instance,
market leader Volvo has consistently commanded a market share below 20 percent and the sales of FFVs in the
400,000-strong Swedish market amount to less than 80,000. For perspective, Hall (2000) ﬁnds a minimum eﬃcient
scale of about 130,000 units/year for automobile plants in the North American market.
22In what follows, we are mostly agnostic about what share of FFV owners actually arbitrages across fuels, simply
reporting ﬁgures for shares of 25, 50 and 75 percent. Huse (2012) documents how the drop in oil prices following
the 2008 recession, which was quickly passed through to domestic fuel prices, eﬀectively making gasoline cheaper
than ethanol in energy-adjusted terms, led to a drop of 73 percent in the monthly sales of ethanol and proposes
a stylized structural model whereby the share of fuel switchers (arbitrageurs) among FFV owners is in the range
46-77 percent.
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5.2 Environmental Eﬀects
CO2 Savings and their Costs Table 4 reports estimated CO2 savings and the associated
costs for the experiments considered.23 The ﬁrst column reports the results for Counterfactual I,
which compares the GCR with the no-policy counterfactual. Assuming all FFV owners use only
ethanol, the CO2 emission savings induced by the GCR are 493.2 thousand tonCO2, as reported
in Panel A. Note, however, that the savings decrease once fuel switching is accounted for, i.e.
CO2 savings reduce by 14 and 18 percent to 424.6 and 406.7 thousand tonCO2 if gasoline usage
increases to 50 and 75 percent, respectively.
Lower CO2 savings imply an increased cost per tonCO2 saved, and this is what Panel B in
Table 4 reports for Counterfactual I. While absence of fuel switching results in a cost of 760
SEK/tonCO2, or $109, accounting for fuel arbitrage results in a sizable increase in the cost of CO2
savings, even though FFVs command a relatively small share of the market: while an increase from
zero to 25 percent in the use of gasoline results in an increase of about 12 percent (about $13) to
850 SEK/tonCO2, the cost can increase by 21 percent to 921 SEK (about $132) if gasoline usage
increases to 75 percent.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Counterfactual II computes CO2 savings and cost estimates obtained from a symmetric version
of the GCR. By not contemplating FFVs, in this counterfactual fuel arbitrage does not play a role,
i.e. cost and savings are ﬂat across diﬀerent levels of gasoline usage. Note also that CO2 savings
are lower than those in the actual GCR: in the absence of fuel switching, these savings are 193.8
thousand tonCO2, whereas 50 percent of gasoline usage induces savings of 192.1 thousand tonCO2.
Not making FFVs eligible for the rebate results in a total cost of just 24 percent of the actual GCR.
Due to the strong presence of FFVs, Counterfactual III results in substantial CO2 emission
savings when compared to the other experiments. On the other hand, fuel arbitrage becomes a
key margin to be taken into consideration. In the absence of fuel switching, the emission savings
amount to 3,159.8 thousand tonCO2, whereas a 50 percent of gasoline usage results in savings of a
still sizable 1,474 thousand tonCO2. Although at 470.9 percent of the cost of the actual GCR the
total cost of the program is substantial, at 558 SEK/tonCO2 its cost relative to emission savings
is comparable to the GCR in the case of no fuel switching. However, the substantial presence of
FFVs in the new car ﬂeet induces a non-trivial cost increase once fuel arbitrage is accounted for:
this cost increases to 1197 and 1704 SEK under 50 and 75 percent of gasoline usage, respectively.
The results in Table 4 show that, without accounting for fuel arbitrage, at about $109 the cost
estimates of the program are comparable to the lower end of the estimates of Li, Linn and Spiller
(2011) for the US, which are in the range $91-288, and roughly 40 percent lower than those of
Beresteanu and Li (2011) for the US HEV program. However, these costs increase to about $126
($132) if 50 (75) percent of FFV owners arbitrage across fuels. A symmetric version of the GCR
results in both lower CO2 savings and lower costs per tonCO2 saved. The extent to which such a
program would be preferred to the actual GCR depends on the objective function of the regulator.
Finally, full adoption of the FFV technology by carmakers would induce substantial CO2 savings
as compared to the GCR benchmark, but also substantial cost increases per tonCO2 saved once
fuel arbitrage is accounted for.
23While the results in Table 4 are obtained under the maintained assumption of a 15-year vehicle lifetime to make
easier to compare to the literature, e.g. Beresteanu and Li (2011), the results in Appendix B show that these results
are qualitatively unchanged under an assumption of 25-year vehicle lifetime.
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5.3 Market Eﬀects
Fuel Segment Market Shares Figure 2a reports market shares of the diﬀerent fuel seg-
ments under the GCR i.e. the actual policy. High emission gasoline vehicles command 50.7 percent
of the market, well ahead of high emission diesel ones, with 24.7 percent. 24 Among the fuel segments
beneﬁting from the GCR, the leading one is the FFV, which commands 14.1 percent, followed by
low emission gasoline and diesel, with 6.68 and 3.61 percent, respectively. Gasoline/electric and
gasoline/CNG vehicles both command less than 1 percent of the market and face negligible changes
across counterfactuals.
Figure 2b examines the eﬀect of abolishing the GCR on the diﬀerent fuel segments. Doing so
beneﬁts mostly high emission vehicles, with the market share commanded by gasoline and diesel
ones increasing by 4.89 and 0.603 percentage points (pp hereafter), respectively. The marked dif-
ference in the change in market shares comes from the fact that FFVs are closer competitors to
high-emission gasoline than high-emission diesel vehicles: the FFV technology essentially piggy-
backs on the Otto cycle technology used by gasoline vehicles. On the other hand, abolishing the
GCR would adversely aﬀect the market shares of FFVs and low-emission vehicles (both gasoline
and diesel), with decreases of 1.95, 1.91 and 1.64pp, respectively. Equivalently, the GCR shifted
demand from high emission vehicles  especially gasoline ones  to FFVs and low emission ones,
precisely the segments favored by the GCR.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2c examines what would have happened had the GCR treated regular and alternative
fuels symmetrically. Low emission vehicles are the main gainers in that they experienced an increase
of 1.57 and 0.589pp for gasoline and diesel vehicles, respectively. The main take-away from Figure
2c is however the low impact of a symmetric version of the GCR on the share of FFVs. This
ﬁnding suggests that a substantial share of consumers would have purchased FFVs regardless of
the GCR, likely due to the potentially lower operating costs provided by such technology (see Huse
and Koptyug 2012b for such an analysis at the micro level). As for high emission gasoline and
diesel, their market shares decreased by 1.3 and 0.521pp, respectively.
Had carmakers decided to replace all their captive gasoline models with FFV versions, the
dominant fuel segment would be high emission FFVs, which would command a 65.1 percent market
share, as shown in Figure 2d.25 High emission diesel vehicles would lose 6pp and command a 18.7
percent market share, followed by low emission FFVs, with 13.6 percent, and low emission diesel
vehicles, with 2.4 percent. While high emission FFVs would essentially absorb the market shares
of high emission gasoline and FFV vehicles (all of which are high emission) under the GCR, the
main gainers according to this experiment would be low emission FFVs, which would command
7pp above the market share of low emission gasoline vehicles under the GCR. On the other hand,
and as expected, diesel vehicles would lose substantial market share, especially in the high emission
segment.
The results in Figure 2 suggest that the actual GCR has shifted demand from high emission
vehicles to both FFVs and low emission vehicles. A symmetric version of the GCR would have
24In what follows, we report inside shares, i.e. market shares sum to one, ignoring the role of the outside good
for the sake of comparability across scenarios. Appendix B provides supporting evidence that the share of the
outside good was unaﬀected by the GCR.
25Note that Figure 2d displays market shares instead of changes thereof. The reason for reporting this result in
a diﬀerent way is the introduction of the high- and low- emission FFVs fuel segments.
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further increased the presence of low emission vehicles and hardly aﬀected the one of FFVs, sug-
gesting that the skew towards renewables  which was an essential part of the GCR  would not
have been necessary, i.e. consumers would have purchased FFVs regardless. However, had car-
makers adopted the FFV technology en masse , the main gainers would have been low emission
FFVs, which would make substantial ground at the expense of diesel vehicles, both low and high
emission.
Brand Market Shares Figure 3a reports the eﬀect of the GCR on brand-level market shares.
The main players operating in the Swedish market are Volvo (15.9 percent market share), Toyota
(10.1 percent), Peugeot (8.34 percent) and Volkswagen (VW, 6.5 percent), with brands Ford,
Hyundai, Skoda, Citroen and Audi also commanding market shares above 3 percent. Despite
being more of a niche player, for having a narrow range of models, Swedish brand Saab has
historically been placed among the top 10 brands in the sample period (see Huse and Koptyug
2012 for details).
Figure 3b, which reports the results of the counterfactual of no GCR, shows that both Swedish
and high-end German brands are at the losing end of the policy. The main gainer under such
counterfactual would be Mercedes, with a 2.5pp increase in market shares, followed by Volvo
(2.28pp), Audi (1.62pp), BMW (1.26pp) and Saab (1.24pp). Swedish and high-end German brands
are close competitors in the Swedish market, having a marked presence in the high-end gasoline
segment. It then comes as no surprise the fact that they share the burden of the GCR. On the
other hand, lower-end (or value) brands Peugeot, Kia and Skoda decrease their market shares by
amounts in the range 1.0-2.19pp under the counterfactual of no GCR. As we detail below, these
are brands typically oﬀering the low-end models within the high-emission (gasoline or diesel) fuel
segments.
Figure 3c shows the eﬀect of the symmetric GCR on the overall market shares of car manu-
facturers. The main brands beneﬁting from such a policy would be Toyota, Citroen and Peugeot,
all of which have a marked presence in low emission segments, whereas the main loser would be
Volvo, which has a substantial presence in the FFV and high-emission segments, precisely the ones
losing out from a symmetric policy.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Figure 3d shows the eﬀects of the full conversion to the FFV technology by all carmakers. The
main gainer is Toyota (2.57pp), which is followed by high-end German brands Mercedes, Audi
and BMW (1.92, 0.957 and 0.821pp, respectively), and Swedish brand Saab (1.15pp). Except
for Toyota, these are among the brands most aﬀected by the GCR, whose high emission gasoline
vehicles would become FFVs and recover market share. Importantly, Volvo would experience
a mild increase of less than 0.5pp in market shares. On the other hand, the main losers from
Counterfactual III are brands such as VW, Skoda, Kia and Opel, with decreases in the range
1.1-1.6pp. Again, these are mostly brands which have beneﬁted from the GCR and would lose out
once all larger cars are turned into FFVs.
The ﬁndings in Figure 3 thus highlight three main features. First, the main losers following
the GCR were local brands Saab and Volvo, together with high-end German brands Audi, BMW
and Mercedes. Second, for most of these brands, the actual GCR is the worst scenario among the
counterfactuals considered (the exception is Volvo under Counterfactual II). Finally, one way how
these brands could have recovered market share would be to fully convert their gasoline models to
the FFV technology.
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Conclusion
This paper estimates a structural model of the Swedish car market to examine environmental
and market eﬀects of the Swedish green car rebate (GCR). its ﬁndings can be summarized as
follows. First, the cost of the program was comparable to those of recent US counterparts, with
an estimated cost of CO2 emission savings to be in the range $109-132/ton CO2. This amount is
over ﬁve times the price of an EU emission permit and at the lower end of estimates for the US,
even if the Swedish program aﬀected the market more widely than elsewhere.
Second, Swedish and high-end German brands, all of which have a marked presence in the high
emission gasoline segment, lose substantial market share as a result of the GCR. This result is at
odds with the view that regulators are captured by (local) businesses.
Third, the ﬁnding that a symmetric version of the GCR has mild eﬀects on the market share
of FFVs suggests that the potentially lower operating costs provided by this technology would
have been enough to attract consumers to this fuel segment, rendering the GCR unnecessary to
shift demand towards vehicles able to operate on alternative fuels. Put in another way, the FFV
technology would not need to be subsidized to attract consumers.
Within a context of new, hybrid, technologies such as the FFV, our fourth conclusion is that
fuel choice is a key margin policymakers should take into account when designing policy. While
one upside of ﬂexible-fuel (or hybrid) technologies is the avoidance of technological lock-in, an
immediate downside is that additional costs are incurred when consumers arbitrage across fuels.
Finally, full conversion to the FFV technology would have resulted in extremely high costs for
the program and amplify the perverse eﬀects of fuel arbitrage, yet allowing carmakers most severely
aﬀected by the actual policy to recover market share via the adoption of the FFV technology. Had
carmakers decided to switch their captive gasoline cars to the FFV technology, the cost of the GCR
would have increased by a ﬁvefold, but without obvious improvements in terms of CO2 savings or
costs thereof.
In assessing a unique policy skewed toward renewables and which aﬀected a substantial share
of the new car market, our ﬁndings highlight that policymakers ought to take into account the
technologies in use in the markets they are regulating. This issue is to become ever more important
as more alternative technologies, e.g. hybrid, multifuel, are brought to market in the coming years.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO
THE MARKET IMPACT AND THE COST OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
EVIDENCE FROM THE SWEDISH GREEN CAR REBATE
Cristian Huse and Claudio Lucinda
A Data
Sales data Vroom has adjusted new car registration data to better represent the cars that
are actually used by an individual and that do not serve as demonstration units or alike. For a
registration to be included in the data set, the vehicle has to be acquired by an individual within
30 days of the registration. The sales data is aggregated at the base model level for each fuel type,
i.e. the item Audi A3 gasoline contains all versions of the A3 that are primarily driven on gasoline.
We consider seven diﬀerent fuel segments: high- and low-emission gasoline; high- and low-emission
diesel; gasoline/ethanol (FFVs); gasoline/gas (CNG); and electric hybrids.
Vehicle characteristics The characteristics data is on a more disaggregated level than the sales
data, e.g. there are 18 diﬀerent Audi A3 gasoline versions. To be able to combine characteristics
and sales data, we have aggregated the characteristics over sub-models based on the baseline
model, thus following the literature, e.g. BLP (1995). Following the Swedish Consumer Agency
deﬁnition, we deﬁne market segments according to vehicle weight, with the ﬁve segments deﬁned
by the thresholds 1100, 1250, 1400 and 1600 kg.
Combining sales data and characteristics When combining the sales data and the charac-
teristics data, a small fraction of the observations did not have a match. We thus expanded our
search as follows, checking the following manually. First, we checked for the same brand, model
and fuel type for the following year, since models for a given year are released late in the prior fall.
Second, we checked for the same brand and fuel type for the same year. Third, for the same brand
and fuel type for the following year. Finally, for the same fuel type and same year (the standard
deviation is lower within a population consisting of cars of the same fuel type but diﬀerent brands
than within a population of a certain brand but with diﬀerent fuel types).
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Fuel economy and CO2 emissions In the consumer guides, the emission data for FFVs is
solely based on gasoline driving. According to The Swedish Consumer Agency (2008), there are no
oﬃcial emission values for ethanol driving. However, in their report on the climate eﬀects of new
cars, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2008a) develops a way to calculate emission
reductions. First, due to its lower energy content, E85 consumption is approximately 35 percent
higher than gasoline consumption. Second, carbon dioxide emissions for E85 are 688.3 g/l, regard-
less of whether it made of sugar cane ethanol or sulphite pulp ethanol. Using this and the data on
gasoline consumption from the guides, we can calculate ethanol consumption in l/100km (gasoline
consumption*1.35) and carbon dioxide emissions in g/km (ethanol consumption*688.3/100). Thus,
carbon dioxide emissions for E85 could be calculated by multiplying the gasoline consumption in
l/100km by 9.29205 ( 1.35×688.3
100
). For winter months, the ethanol blend used is E75, which has a
higher consumption (approximately 42% higher). For these months, the carbon dioxide emissions
are multiplied by
(
1.42×688.3
100
)
.
To estimate CO2 emissions, we estimate yearly mileage driven (in km), together with a measure
of CO2 emissions (in g/km). For captive cars, mileage estimates are based on the results reported
in Appendix C whereas for FFVs they also depend on the fraction of vehicle owners using each fuel.
We consider four cases, namely 0, 25, 50 and 75 percent gasoline usage. Although we do not take
a stand on which level looks more appropriate, Huse (2012) documents a 73 percent reduction in
monthly ethanol sales following the 2008 oil price drop, which suggest that fuel switchers correspond
to a non-negligible share of FFV owners.
The emission data for gas (CNG) is based on what is called certiﬁcation gas, which is the
same as fossil gas (Din Bil Stockholm/Hammarby, 2008). Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil gas
are evaluated to be 2120 g/m3 whereas for biogas these are evaluated to 390 g/m3. The supply
of vehicle gas in Sweden consists of both fossil gas and biogas, as well as a mixture of the two.
According to Din Bil, the supply is evenly split, which is consistent with the report by the Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency (2008a) which states that, in 2007, 53 percent of the vehicle gas
sold was biogas and 47 percent was fossil gas. The emission data for gas cars is hence not correct
since it assumes all cars are driven on fossil gas, thus the general emission levels for gas cars are
exaggerated. We therefore re-estimate these to be equal to gas consumption per km*(2120*0.47 +
390*0.53), based on the numbers above.
Potential market To go from observed quantities to observed market shares we need to deﬁne
the size of the potential market for each time period. One way to obtain the potential market
variables would be by estimating them, as suggested in Reiss and Wolak (2007). Alternatively, one
could follow the criterion used in BLP (1995), where the total number of households constitutes
the potential market. According to Reiss and Wolak (2007), this deﬁnition has some shortcomings.
First, not all households can aﬀord a new car and other entities than households can purchase cars.
Since we only examine car sales to individuals, only the former poses a possible problem. It is not
realistic that all households can aﬀord to purchase a new car, therefore this would overestimate
the potential market. Therefore we deﬁne the market as the number of individuals (instead of
households, as Sweden has a high number of single person households) above the age of 20 with
a yearly income of 200,000 SEK (about $27,500) or more. These are the potential purchasers of a
new car. It is however unlikely that they can consider buying a new car each month. We therefore
assume that consumers generally consider buying a new car every ﬁfth year, thereby dividing the
numbers by 60.
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B Mileage Regressions
We use data from the Swedish Motor Vehicle Inspection Company to estimate the average
yearly kilometerage of a vehicle (measured in kilometers, km). Each observation (a combination of
brand-model-segment-fuel-vintage) is weighted according to the number of subjects inspected. Our
preferred speciﬁcation is reported under Column 5 in table B1 and has controls for age, fuel ﬁxed-
eﬀects, age-fuel interactions, fuel-year interactions (which captures fuel price levels at the yearly
frequency) and ﬁxed-eﬀects for brand-model-segment, and year. Based on this speciﬁcation, we
then estimate the lifetime kilometerage of cars disaggregated by fuel.
TABLE B1 ABOUT HERE
Associated kilometerage estimates for Column 5 assuming a vehicle lifetime of 15 years are
reported in Table B2 and are consistent with some stylized facts.26 First, yearly kilometerage
decreases with age. Second, diesel vehicles are the most heavily used vehicles whereas gasoline
ones are the least heavily used. Gasoline/CNG vehicles are slightly less used than diesel ones, but
more than FFVs and gasoline/electric vehicles.
TABLE B2 ABOUT HERE
26While Table B2 reports estimates based on a 15-year vehicle lifetime, Appendix B carries out the same analysis
as in the text with a 25-year vehicle lifetime. The lifespan of a car can arguably be substantially longer, but
anecdotal evidence for Sweden suggests that older cars are kept in the (aﬀordable and widespread) country houses
of the average Swedish household. Being based on the Summer house essentially implies that these cars will run
for few weeks during summer every year.
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C Counterfactuals
Impact of the rebate on aggregate sales When calculating the counterfactuals, we need
an estimate of the share of the outside good. In order for us to be able to use the market shares
for the outside good from the actual scenario, i.e. with the rebate, we must ensure that there is
no correlation between the rebate and total sales. We follow Chandra et al (2010) and examine
the eﬀect of the rebate on aggregate sales by estimating the following equation
ln(total−salest) = α + φ.1{GCRt}+ z′tβ + v
where 1{GCRt} represents the rebate dummy, zt contains potential market characteristics such
as the CPI and the Industrial production index by Statistics Sweden. The results are reported
in Table C1. There is no evidence of an eﬀect of the rebate on aggregate sales. Thus we use the
actual market shares for the outside good when computing the counterfactuals.
TABLE C1 ABOUT HERE
Impact of the assumption of vehicle lifetime on costs and CO2 savings Following the
literature, see e.g. Beresteanu and Li (2011), in the main text we performed our calculations under
the assumption that vehicle lifetime is 15 years. To gauge the eﬀect of this assumptions, we re-did
our calculations under the assumptions of a 25-year lifetime  the results are reported in Table C2.
TABLE C2 ABOUT HERE
Although the results do change in quantitative terms, they are similar in qualitative terms.
The alternative estimates for Counterfactuals I and II reported in Panel A are not surprising in
that they show an increase in CO2 savings due to the increased lifetime of the ﬂeet. For instance,
increasing lifetime by 67 percent (25/15 years) results in an 18 percent increase in CO2 savings.
The reason why the increase in savings is less than proportional than the one in lifetime is the
decreasing yearly kilometerage of older vehicles (see Table B2 for the case up to 15 years). However,
when it comes to Counterfactual III, notice that CO2 savings increase only if all FFV owners are
assumed to drive on gasoline (0% gasoline usage)  fuel arbitrage is such that CO2 savings may
indeed decrease under an extended vehicle lifetime. On the cost side, the results mirror those
reported in the text in that the cost of CO2 savings decreases under Counterfactuals I and II and
typically increases for Counterfactual III.
A comparison of the estimates above with those in the literature shows that the ﬁndings in the
text are robust to changes in the lifetime assumption. In particular, notice that at 642 SEK (or
$91.7), the cost of the program in the benchmark case (CF I with 0% gasoline usage) is almost
identical to those in Beresteanu and Li (2011), with fuel arbitrage increasing such cost by up to
20 percent if gasoline usage reaches 75%.
Finally, the relative costs of Counterfactuals II and II as compared to those of Counterfactual
I are also quite similar, being hardly aﬀected by the lifetime assumption.
Computing counterfactuals In what follows we illustrate the computation of counterfactuals,
always dropping the subscript t to save on notation. First, let < be the set of vehicles contem-
plated by the rebate. In the actual GCR, this would correspond to (1) vehicles able to operate
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on alternative fuels; and (2) vehicles operating on regular fuels and emitting no more than 120
gCO2/km; in the case of the symmetric GCR this would correspond to vehicles emitting no more
than 120 gCO2/km, regardless of fuel. Next, let r be the value of the rebate in real terms. Finally,
deﬁne p˜j = pj − r.1{j ∈ <} as the price faced by consumers if a policy is in place.
With the above, market shares can be written as sj(p˜j, xj, ξj; θ) and the market demand for
product j is given by Dj(p˜j, xj, ξj; θ) = M.sj(p˜j, xj, ξj; θ) where M denotes the potential market
size. Proﬁts for ﬁrm f are given by
pif =
∑
j∈=f
(pj − cj)Dj(p˜j, xj, ξj; θ)
where =f denotes the sets of products produced by ﬁrm f . Note the distinction between prices p˜j
faced by consumers and prices pj faced by ﬁrms: the former appear only as an argument of the
demand function since the ﬁrms receive the latter, i.e..the rebate is a transfer from the government
to consumers.
Estimating demand amounts to obtaining an estimate θˆ for the parameter vector θ (from a
random-coeﬃcients logit model, see Speciﬁcation 3 in Table 3) which is kept ﬁxed when calculating
the counterfactuals. For each counterfactual, we re-solve the problem of the ﬁrms following a given
policy by choosing prices pj to maximize their proﬁts. This is done by solving the non-linear
system of equations implied by the ﬁrst-order conditions from the maximization problem above.
The resulting prices are used together with the remaining model characteristics to obtain estimated
shares. This results in the market shares per product, brand and fuel discussed in the paper.
For each vehicle sold, we combine the estimated lifetime kilometerage (see Table B2 in Appendix
B for details) with information on emissions at the model level to calculate lifetime CO2 emissions.
To distinguish between gasoline and ethanol use of FFVs, we proceed as discussed in Appendix A
to acount for the diﬀerent CO2 emissions of these fuels. Moreover, we re-calculated CO2 emissons
assuming 25, 50 and 75 percent of FFV owners arbitrage across fuels. Finally, we obtain the cost
of the policy per tonCO2 by dividing the total CO2 emissions of all vehicles sold by the total cost
of the policy.
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D Alternative Demand Speciﬁcations
We have conducted two sets of robustness checks. First, we compared our estimates based
on the nested ﬁxed-point algorithm (NFP) with alternative ones based on the MPEC algorithm
(Dubé, Fox and Su 2011).27 The results are similar to those reported in Table 3.
Second, we considered alternative speciﬁcations of the conditional indirect utility function used
to estimate demand. For instance, we considered the following alternatives for the price and/or
engine size coeﬃcients:
1. β∗Price = βPrice + σyyi + σAGEAGEi. Both yi and AGEi were draws from the income and age
distributions of the Swedish population
2. β∗Price = βPrice + σyyi and β
∗
CC = β¯CC + σAGEAGEi. In this alternative, we experimented
with heterogeneity based in income for the price coeﬃcient and heterogeneity based on age
for the engine size coeﬃcient.
3. β∗Price =
βPrice
yi
and β∗CC = βCC + σvi. Here, vi are draws from the Standard Normal distribu-
tion whereas yi are draws from the income distribution (this is inspired in Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes 1999 and Beresteanu and Li 2011).
4. β∗Price =
βPrice
yi
+ σvi. This is another alternative speciﬁcation inspired by Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1999) and Beresteanu and Li (2011).
No speciﬁcation was able to deliver results better than those of the ones reported in Table 3. More
speciﬁcally, they were not able to capture enough heterogeneity to ensure the markups to be not
monotonically decreasing with product prices. Since our market shares are quite small, given the
large number of models in each time period, low heterogeneity implied not only lower percentage
markups for higher priced cars, but also lower absolute markups for such automobiles, clearly at
odds with what one would expect in this market.
27NFP settings included a convergence tolerance of 1e-13 for the contraction and 1e-6 for the optimization using
the KNITRO optimizer.
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E Brand Market Shares within Fuel Segments
In what follows, we decompose the changes in market shares within each of the ﬁve fuel segments
for the three counterfactuals considered, so as to allow discerning gainers from losers at a more
disaggregated level.
(i) High Emission Gasoline Segment Leading brands in the high emission gasoline segment
under the GCR are Toyota, Volvo, VW, Peugeot and Skoda, each commanding market shares of
at least 3.5 percent of the total market, see Figure E1a.
As already suggested in Figure 2b, the high emission gasoline fuel segment was hit hard by the
GCR. The changes in market shares for Counterfactual I, reported in Figure E1b, show that this
is the fuel segment where Swedish and high-end German brands saw their biggest losses whereas
value brands saw substantial gains: abolishing the GCR would have resulted in increases of over
2pp in the market shares of Volvo and Mercedes, over 1pp for BMW and Audi and nearly 1pp for
Saab, as well as decreases of at least 1pp for brands such as Skoda, Peugeot and Toyota.
FIGURE E1 ABOUT HERE
Figure E1c shows how the losses within the high emission gasoline segment, ﬁrst detected in
Figure 2c, were shared across brands in the case of a symmetric GCR. Overall, such losses were
small and evenly spread, with only Volvo and Toyota facing decreases of over 0.1pp.
All in all, comparing the eﬀects reported in Figures 3b and E1b lends further support to the
view that Swedish and high-end German brands were at the losing end of the GCR: these losses
come mostly from the high emission gasoline segment, of which FFV models (all of which are high
emission vehicles in our data) are close substitutes.
(ii) High Emission Diesel Segment Volvo is the leading brand within the high emission diesel
segment, commanding a 6.24 percent market share, and followed by Peugeot and VW, both of
which command just over 2 percent, and far ahead of the remaining brands, see Figure E2a.
Figure E2b shows that under no policy, the main gainer would be Toyota (1.49pp), well ahead
of brands Audi and Saab, both of which command about 0.4pp. The main losers are value brands
Peugeot, Fiat, Hyundai and Kia, all of which would have lost about half a percentage point from
the abolition of the program.
FIGURE E2 ABOUT HERE
Figure E2c shows that the high emission diesel segment is hardly aﬀected by the symmetric
GCR counterfactual: the only brand losing over 0.1pp is Volvo. Finally, Figure E2d shows how
the losses in the high emission diesel segment from the counterfactual of full conversion to the
FFV technology reﬂected on the diﬀerent brands. The main loser is Volvo with a loss of 1.88pp,
followed by Peugeot (0.966pp); brands Kia, Hyundai, VW and Fiat also witness a loss of at least
0.6pp in this scenario.
(iii) Low Emission Gasoline Segment The main players in this segment are Toyota, Peugeot,
Hyundai and Citroen, with market shares in the range 0.9-2.82 percent of the market. Figure E3b
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shows that under the counterfactual of no policy, Asian manufacturers Toyota and Hyundai are
the main losers in this segment, , with a decrease of roughly 0.8pp in market shares.
FIGURE E3 ABOUT HERE
As already reported in Figure 2c, the low emission gasoline segment witnessed an increase
in market share under Counterfactual II. Figure E3c shows that the main gainer was Toyota
(0.649pp), followed by Peugeot (0.312pp) and Citroen (0.231pp).
(iv) Low Emission Diesel Segment The main player in the low emission diesel segment under
the GCR is Citroen, which commands a market share of 1.44, well ahead of VW and Opel, both
of which command about 0.5 percent, see Figure E4a. Figure E4b shows that the leadership of
Citroen results essentially from the GCR  abolishing it results in a decrease of roughly 1pp for
the French brand.
FIGURE E4 ABOUT HERE
Figure E4c shows that the symmetric GCR has a mild eﬀect across brands whereas Figure E4d
shows that full conversion to the FFV technology of the existing gasoline models would again have
mostly hurt Citroen, which would have lost nearly 0.9pp.
(v) FFV Segment The main players in the FFV segment are Swedish brands Volvo and
Saab (5.08 and 2.83 percent, respectively), followed by Ford (which introduced FFVs in Sweden),
Peugeot, VW and Renault (with 2.31, 1.15, 0.911 and 0.877 percent, respectively), see Figure
E5a. The counterfactual of no policy in Figure E5b shows that these brands beneﬁted by the
GCR. Next, Figure E5c shows that a symmetric version of the GCR would have mild eﬀects across
brands  only Volvo would lose more than 0.1pp. Figure E5c thus shows not only that consumers
would have purchased FFVs even without the GCR as already pointed out in Figure 2c, but
also that the brands operating within this segment would hardly be aﬀected.
FIGURE E5 ABOUT HERE
Finally, Figure E5d shows that in a scenario of full conversion to the FFV technology, the
main gainers in the high emission FFV segment would essentially be the Swedish and high-end
German brands, i.e. the ones losing out from the GCR due to their strong presence in the high
emission gasoline segment. On the other hand, the main losers would have been value brands such
as Skoda and Peugeot, besides Toyota. These value brands would however be the main gainers
in the low emission FFV segment, as reported in Figure E5e. For instance, Toyota and Peugeot
would command market shares of 3.31 and 1.82 percent, respectively, compared to 2.82 and 1.17
percent in the low-emission gasoline segment under the GCR.
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TABLE 1 – Descriptive Statistics of Selected European Passenger Car Markets 
  
  
Sweden 
 
France 
 
Germany 
       Passenger car fleet, millions (2008) 
 
4.3 
 
30.9 
 
41.3 
       Passenger cars per 100 inhabitants (2008) 46.3 
 
49.5 
 
50.4 
       % Households with a vehicle (2006)     84.5 
 
82 
 
NA 
       Average car age, years (2008) 
 
9.5 
 
8.3 
 
8.2 
       Average engine of new cars, in cc (2007) 
 
1,964 
 
1,680 
 
1,863 
       Average power of new cars, in kw (2007) 
 
105 
 
80 
 
96 
       % Passenger cars able to run on fuels  
      other than gasoline and diesel (2008) 
 
3.8 
 
0 
 
0.9 
       Share of cars ≤ 5 years (2008) 
 
29.0% 
 
33.4% 
 
34.3% 
       Share of cars 5-10 years (2008) 
 
31.9% 
 
33.0% 
 
33.0% 
       Share of cars > 10 years (2008) 
 
39.1% 
 
33.6% 
 
33.6% 
              
 
Note: This table is constructed using data from ANFAC (2010). Engine sizes are reported in cc (cubic 
centimeters).  
 
TABLE 2 – Descriptive Statistics of Models Available on the Swedish Market, by Fuel Segment 
 
 
CO2 Emissions (gCO2/km) 
Fuel    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total  Mean 210.8 210.4 205.5 197.7 198.8 191.4 
                  se(mean) 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 
                  Median 205 205 197 185 188 181 
                  1Q-3Q 175-239 172-239 167-233 159-223 161-225 155-217 
 
#brands 37 40 40 45 44 40 
 
#models 1854 1920 2101 1624 1946 2026 
Total ≤ 120g Mean 107.1 106.8 113.6 114.4 113.6 114.1 
 
se(mean) 3.1 2.9 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.7 
 
median 114.5 113 116 118 116 118 
 
1Q-3Q 90-118 90-116 109-119 109-119 109-116 109-119 
 
#brands 8 8 10 13 17 22 
                 #models 20 21 40 46 69 89 
Gasoline mean 218.0 218.4 215.4 210.5 212.4 205.9 
                  se(mean) 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.7 
                  median 213 211 207 194 198 193 
                  1Q-3Q 184-246 182-249 180-244 169-238 173-238 167-232 
 
#brands 37 40 40 45 43 39 
 
#models 1398 1417 1473 1081 1225 1195 
Gasoline ≤ 120g mean 116.3 115.3 112.1 111.1 112.1 113.1 
 
se(mean) 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 
 
median 116 116 111 109 109 112 
 
1Q-3Q 113-119 113-116 109-116 109-113 109-116 109-119 
 
#brands 3 2 4 5 7 12 
                 #models 10 8 14 10 18 36 
Diesel  mean 188.8 188.1 183.0 172.3 174.8 168.4 
                  se(mean) 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.3 
                  median 185.5 187 174 162 169 160.5 
                  1Q-3Q 153-215 153-216 154-210 145-189 148-193 146-184 
 
#brands 28 28 31 32 34 35 
 
#models 442 491 596 513 667 748 
Diesel ≤ 120g mean 97.1 101.3 114.8 115.8 114.4 115.2 
 
se(mean) 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4 4.5 5.2 
 
median 90 100 118 119 119 119 
 
1Q-3Q 90-116 90-116 115-119 116-119 114.5-119 112-119 
 
#brands 5 6 6 11 14 19 
                 #models 9 12 23 33 48 51 
FFV mean 165.0 198.0 185.4 184.4 194.2 195.1 
                  se(mean) 0.0 12.2 6.8 4.6 3.7 3.1 
                  median 165 215 172 175.5 184.5 191.5 
                  1Q-3Q 165-165 150-228 169-179 169-206 174-213 177-214 
 
#brands 1 3 3 3 10 12 
 
#models 2 11 17 18 44 66 
FFV ≤ 120g #models 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gasoline/CNG mean 199.5 198.0 164.4 150.4 147.6 156.9 
                  se(mean) 12.4 12.2 7.9 6.3 9.7 4.5 
                  median 213 228 164 157 155 157 
                  1Q-3Q 150-231 150-215 148-183 136.5-164 138-160 144-167 
 
#brands 5 5 5 5 4 3 
                 #models 11 11 11 8 5 11 
Gasoline/Electric mean 104.0 104.0 147.8 147.8 161.8 171.3 
                  se(mean) . . 23.9 23.9 23.3 21.3 
                  median 104 104 147.5 147.5 185 188.5 
                  1Q-3Q 104-104 104-104 106.5-189 106.5-189 109-192 109-219 
 
#brands 1 1 3 3 3 3 
                 #models 1 1 4 4 5 6 
Note: This table reports sample statistics of the distribution of engine CO2 emissions (measured in 
gCO2/km, running on gasoline or diesel) disaggregated by fuel and the number of brands and car models 
present in each fuel segment. 
TABLE 3 – Demand Estimates 
              
                         (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
                          
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
RC Logit   
 
-0.0026 *** -0.0114 *** -0.0218 *** 
                         (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
  
 
 
      
 
0.0072 *** 0.0204 *** 0.0243 *** 
                         (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
  
 
 
      0.0001     0.0003 *** 0.0002 * 
                         (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.03) 
  
 
 
      -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** 
                         (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
  
 
 
      
 
-0.2030 *** -0.1430 *** -0.0565 
 
 
(0.02)     (0.02)     (0.10) 
  
 
 
      
    
0.0060 *** 
     
(0.00) 
 
       Brand FEs Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
       Time FEs Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
       Market segment FEs Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
       Fuel segment FEs Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
       Fuel consumption-fuel segment 
interactions Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
N                        13962     13962     13962   
Percentiles Own-price elasticities 
p10 -1.0 
 
-4.2 
 
-5.3 
 p25 -0.7 
 
-3.1 
 
-4.6 
 p50 -0.6 
 
-2.4 
 
-3.9 
 p75 -0.4 
 
-1.8 
 
-3.1 
 p90 -0.3   -1.4   -2.5   
Note: Standard errors clustered by brand. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The value of the 
F-statistic of the first-stage regression is 31.48. With 5 and 13484 degrees of freedom, it is 
 significant at the 1 percent level. 
         
TABLE 4 – CO2 Savings and Costs of Alternative Policies 
 
    
 
CF I CF II CF III 
  "No GCR" "Symmetric GCR" "Full FFV Adoption" 
    Panel A: CO2 Savings (thousands tonCO2) 
Gasoline usage 
   0% 493.2 193.8 3,159.8 
25% 441.0 192.5 1,878.6 
50% 424.6 192.1 1,474.0 
75% 406.7 191.6 1,035.6 
        
    Panel B: Cost of CO2 Savings (SEK/tonCO2 saved) 
 Gasoline usage 
 0% 760 465 558 
25% 850 468 939 
50% 883 469 1197 
75% 921 470 1704 
 
   
 
Total Cost of Program as a Percentage of the GCR 
Percentage -- 24.0 470.9 
        
    Note: This table reports the total cost of the program in each scenario in Panel A, lifetime savings in tons of CO2 emissions induced by the 
different counterfactuals in Panel B and their associated costs in SEK/tonCO2 in Panel C. Results are reported for the assumption of 
Bertrand-Nash pricing as well as different levels of gasoline usage among FFV owners to illustrate the impact of fuel arbitrage on the 
program. All computations assume the lifetime of a vehicle to be 15 years. See Appendix A for details on the assumptions on gasoline 
usage, Appendix B for a robustness check using a 25-year lifetime assumption, and Appendix C for mileage regression results. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 – Market Shares by Fuel Segment 
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Note: This figure depicts market shares of passenger cars sold to private individuals in the Swedish car market at the monthly frequency 
disaggregated by fuel segments. Vehicles running on regular fuels are split into two groups, namely high- and low-emission regular vehicles 
depending on whether they emit more or less than 120 gCO2/km. Vehicles able to run on alternative fuels are split into FFVs 
(gasoline/ethanol, or FFVs), gasoline/CNG and gasoline/electric. The figure shows the decrease in the market shares of high-emission 
regular vehicles and the increase in those of low-emission regular vehicles and FFVs, the leading alternative vehicle, while showing that the 
market shares of gasoline/CNG and gasoline/electric vehicles were essentially flat during the GCR period. The figure also suggests the 
existence of anticipatory effects at the (publicly announced) and of the GCR in June 2009, but no compelling evidence thereof at its start in 
April 2007. 
FIGURE 2 – Effect of Alternative Policies on Fuel Segment Market Shares 
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Figure 2a – GCR market shares    Figure 2b – Counterfactual I: No GCR vs. GCR 
 
-1.3 
-.521
-.356
-3.8e-04
.017 
.589 
1.57 
-2 -1 0 1 2
Percentage Points
Gasoline, high emission
Diesel, high emission
FFV
Gasol/CNG
Gasol/Electric
Diesel, low emission
Gasoline, low emission
Changes in Market Shares - Fuel Segments
.023 
.151 
2.4  
13.6 
18.7 
65.1 
0 20 40 60 80
Percentage Points
Gasol/CNG
Gasol/Electric
Diesel, low emission
FFV, low emission
Diesel, high emission
FFV, high emission
Market Shares - Fuel Segments
 
Figure 2c – Counterfactual II: Symmetric GCR vs. GCR Figure 2d – Counterfactual III: Full Conversion to FFV vs. GCR 
 
Note: This figure displays market shares under the GCR and changes in market shares at the fuel segment induced by alternative policies. 
Figure 2a displays market shares under the GCR (actual policy); Figure 2b displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of no 
policy (i.e., no GCR) as compared to the GCR; Figure 2c displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of a symmetric GCR as 
compared to the GCR; Figure 2d displays market shares (instead of changes thereof) had all carmakers replaced their captive gasoline 
vehicles with FFVs (Note also the distinction between high- and low-emission FFVs when examining Counterfactual III). For the sake of 
clarity, the figure omits some brands for which (changes in) market shares were negligible. 
FIGURE 3 – Effect of Alternative Policies on Brand Market Shares 
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Figure 3a – GCR market shares    Figure 3b – Counterfactual I: No GCR vs. GCR 
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Figure 3c– Counterfactual II: Symmetric GCR vs GCR  Figure 3d – Counterfactual III: Full Conversion to FFV vs GCR 
 
Note: This figure displays brand market shares under the GCR and changes in market shares induced by alternative policies. Figure 3a 
displays market shares under the GCR (actual policy); Figure 3b displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of no policy (i.e., 
no GCR) as compared to the GCR; Figure 3c displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of a symmetric GCR as compared 
to the GCR; Figure 3d displays changes in market shares had all carmakers replaced their captive gasoline vehicles with FFVs as compared to 
the GCR. For the sake of clarity, the figure omits some brands for which changes in market shares were negligible. 
Tables and Figures from Appendix (Not for publication) 
 
Table B1 – Mileage Regressions 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                  (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    
                                 Km/Year         Km/Year         Km/Year         Km/Year         Km/Year 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Constant                      19200.7***      20000.5***      17665.2***      17153.2***      17152.1*** 
                              (220.88)         (19.39)         (22.35)        (1267.45)       (1057.17)    
 
Fuel FEs                          Yes              No              No             Yes             Yes    
 
Year FEs                           No              No              No             Yes             Yes    
 
Fuel-age FEs                       No             Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes    
 
Fuel-year FEs                      No              No              No             Yes             Yes    
 
Brand-model FEs                    No              No             Yes             Yes              No    
 
Brand-model-segment FEs            No              No              No              No             Yes    
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                             2031000         2031000         2031000         2031000         2031000    
R-squared                       .4064           .3626           .8728            .905           .9383    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: t-statistics in brackets, standard errors clustered by brand-fuel. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
The full set of results is available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
 
Table B2 – Lifetime Mileage Estimates, by Fuel 
                                  
       
Age of Vehicle (years) 
     
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Total 
Gasoline 16655 16158 15661 15165 14668 14171 13674 13177 12680 12183 11686 11189 10692 10196 9699 197,654 
Gasoline/electric 19473 18937 18401 17865 17329 16793 16257 15721 15185 14649 14113 13577 13041 12505 11969 235,809 
FFV 19621 19006 18392 17778 17163 16549 15934 15320 14706 14091 13477 12862 12248 11634 11019 229,800 
Gasoline/CNG 19545 19401 19257 19113 18969 18825 18681 18537 18393 18249 18105 17961 17817 17673 17529 278,057 
Diesel 25460 25068 24676 24284 23892 23501 23109 22717 22325 21933 21541 21149 20757 20365 19973 340,749 
 
Note: Mileage disaggregated at the fuel segment based on estimates from Specification 5 in Table C1. Figures are expressed in kilometers. 
 
Table C1 – Regression of Sales on Green Car Rebate and Market Characteristics 
 
  
      
OLS - Dep. var: ln(total sales) (1) 
      
GCR dummy      -0.0124          
                              (-0.20)          
ln(Potential Market)        0.705*** 
                                     (3.92)    
      ln(CPI) -3,744 
                                    (-1.65)    
      ln(Electricity Price)       -1.214*** 
                                    (-3.90)    
      ln(Industrial Production)        1.098*** 
                                     (5.83)    
      Constant -1,309 
                                    (-0.42)    
      
N                        73 
      
R2                              .7522    
      Note: t-statistics in brackets, standard errors clustered by brand-fuel. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
TABLE C2 – CO2 Savings and Costs of Alternative Policies 
 
    
 
CF I CF II CF III 
  "No GCR" "Symmetric GCR" "Full FFV Adoption" 
    Panel A: CO2 Savings (thousands tonCO2) 
Gasoline usage 
   0% 583.6 257.7 3,353.4 
25% 522.6 254.8 1,863.0 
50% 503.3 253.9 1,392.4 
75% 482.4 253.0 882.5 
        
    Panel B: Cost of CO2 Savings (SEK/tonCO2 saved) 
 Gasoline usage 
 0% 642 338 528 
25% 716 341 950 
50% 744 343 1271 
75% 776 344 2006 
 
   
 
Total Cost of Program as a Percentage of the GCR 
Percentage -- 22.9 464.6 
        
    Note: This table (to be compared to Table 4 in the text) reports the total cost of the program in each scenario in Panel A, lifetime savings 
in tons of CO2 emissions induced by the different counterfactuals in Panel B and their associated costs in SEK/tonCO2 in Panel C. 
Results are reported for the assumption of Bertrand-Nash pricing as well as different levels of gasoline usage among FFV owners to 
illustrate the impact of fuel arbitrage on the program. All computations assume the lifetime of a vehicle to be 25 years. See Appendix A for 
details on the assumptions on gasoline usage and Appendix C for mileage regression results. 
FIGURE E1 – Effect of Alternative Policies on Brand Market Shares within High Emission Gasoline Vehicles 
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Figure E1a – GCR market shares    Figure E1b – Counterfactual I: No GCR vs. GCR 
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Figure E1c– Counterfactual II: Symmetric GCR vs GCR   
 
Note: This figure displays brand market shares within the high emission gasoline segment under the GCR and changes in market shares 
induced by alternative policies. Figure E1a displays market shares under the GCR (actual policy); Figure E1b displays changes in market 
shares under the counterfactual of no policy (i.e., no GCR) as compared to the GCR; Figure E1c displays changes in market shares under the 
counterfactual of a symmetric GCR as compared to the GCR. For the sake of clarity, the figure omits some brands for which changes in 
market shares were negligible. 
 
 
FIGURE E2 – Effect of Alternative Policies on Brand Market Shares within High Emission Diesel Vehicles 
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Figure E2a – GCR market shares    Figure E2b – Counterfactual I: No GCR vs. GCR 
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Figure E2c– Counterfactual II: Symmetric GCR vs GCR Figure E2d – Counterfactual III: Full Conversion to FFV vs GCR 
 
Note: This figure displays brand market shares under the GCR and changes in market shares induced by alternative policies. Figure E2a 
displays market shares under the GCR (actual policy); Figure E2b displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of no policy 
(i.e., no GCR) as compared to the GCR; Figure E2c displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of a symmetric GCR as 
compared to the GCR; Figure E2d displays changes in market shares had all carmakers replaced their captive gasoline vehicles with FFVs as 
compared to the GCR. For the sake of clarity, the figure omits some brands for which changes in market shares were negligible. 
 
 
 
FIGURE E3 – Effect of Alternative Policies on Brand Market Shares within Low Emission Gasoline Vehicles 
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Figure E3a – GCR market shares    Figure E3b – Counterfactual I: No GCR vs. GCR 
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Figure E3c– Counterfactual II: Symmetric GCR vs GCR   
 
Note: This figure displays brand market shares under the GCR and changes in market shares induced by alternative policies. Figure E3a 
displays market shares under the GCR (actual policy); Figure E3b displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of no policy 
(i.e., no GCR) as compared to the GCR; Figure E3c displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of a symmetric GCR as 
compared to the GCR. For the sake of clarity, the figure omits some brands for which changes in market shares were negligible. 
 
 
FIGURE E4 – Effect of Alternative Policies on Brand Market Shares within Low Emission Diesel Vehicles 
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Figure E4a – GCR market shares    Figure E4b – Counterfactual I: No GCR vs. GCR 
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Figure E4c– Counterfactual II: Symmetric GCR vs GCR  Figure E4d – Counterfactual III: Full Conversion to FFV vs 
GCR 
 
Note: This figure displays brand market shares under the GCR and changes in market shares induced by alternative policies. Figure E4a 
displays market shares under the GCR (actual policy); Figure E4b displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of no policy 
(i.e., no GCR) as compared to the GCR; Figure E4c displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of a symmetric GCR as 
compared to the GCR; Figure E4d displays changes in market shares had all carmakers replaced their captive gasoline vehicles with FFVs as 
compared to the GCR. For the sake of clarity, the figure omits some brands for which changes in market shares were negligible. 
FIGURE E5 – Effect of Alternative Policies on Brand Market Shares within FFV Vehicles 
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Figure E5a – GCR market shares    Figure E5b – Counterfactual I: No GCR vs. GCR 
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Figure E5c– Counterfactual II: Symmetric GCR vs GCR Figure E5d – Counterfactual III (a): Full Conversion to FFV vs GCR 
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Figure E5e – Counterfactual III (b): Full Conversion to FFV vs GCR 
 
Note: This figure displays brand market shares under the GCR and changes in market shares induced by alternative policies. Figure E5a 
displays market shares under the GCR (actual policy); Figure E5b displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of no policy 
(i.e., no GCR) as compared to the GCR; Figure E5c displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of a symmetric GCR as 
compared to the GCR; Figures E5d and E5e display changes in market shares of high- and low-emission FFVs had all carmakers replaced 
their captive gasoline vehicles with FFVs as compared to the GCR (Note also the distinction between high- and low-emission FFVs when 
examining Counterfactual III). For the sake of clarity, the figure omits some brands for which changes in market shares were negligible. 
 
